


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THE PARTICIPATION IN THE TOURISTY NO PROFIT FIRMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A PRELIMINAR ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This article tends to underline a point of view that I consider disregarded by the literature that regards no profit firms. I will take in consideration the motivational aspect of people that have chosen to operate in no profit firms, not only for the lack of job in the other private and public firms, but because they privilege a sector in which don't prevail formal contracts, but remarkable relationships of cooperation and reciprocity. I will analyze this aspect focusing the attention on no profit firms, operating in touristy activities, which furnishes public goods concerning environmental protection. I believe that the motivations of components of no profit firms are coincident with motivations that determine the phenomenon of volunteering, which has recorded recently an elevated development and to which important and numerous interdisciplinary studies are devoted; they involve various theoretical streams from economic theory to psychology. So, the development of the present article departs by the presentation of a concise review of this literature. In particular, it will regard the motivations of volunteering, in order to precise the motivations of those who participate in no profit firms. This article presents a theoretical model that can explain the results of some empirical and experimental studies which give results in contrast with the neoclassical theory. In the end, it is explained the "Motivation Crowding Theory" which studies as intrinsic motivation can be influenced by extrinsic motivation. This is particularly important for environmental policy.

Keywords: Touristy No Profit Firm, Volunteering, Altruism, Environmental Protection.

JEL: D21, D11, D64, H41.

Theme: Tourism and Sustainable Economic Development: Macro and Micro Economic Issues.

Introduction

In the last decade, the literature about no profit firms has become wealthy enormously at the national and international level within the economic theory and others disciplines. When the use of the term "third sector" is widespread, it, in a first time, comprised only no profit firms and was considered important like the public sector, criticized for its ineffectiveness, and like the traditional sector of for profit firms, in which some types of activity were neglected because they had limited profits or presented an elevated risky.

Subsequently the third sector has been widened, including all the organizations without profit, but, at the same time, tightening its action's space that were limited at the pursuit of social objectives. This especially in Italy after the law on the ONLUS.

In this article I don't want criticize the literature regarding no profit firms, but my exposition tends to underline a point of view that I consider disregarded. I will take in consideration the motivational aspect of people who choose to operate in a no profit firm, not only for the lack of job in the other two sectors, but because they privilege a sector in which formal contracts don't prevail, but there are remarkable relationships of cooperation and reciprocity. I will analyze this aspect focusing the attention on no profit firm that furnishes public goods concerning environmental protection in touristy activity.

I believes that components' motivations of no profit firms are coincident with the motivations that determine the phenomenon of volunteering, which has recorded recently an elevated development and to which important and numerous interdisciplinary studies has been devoted; they involve various theoretical streams from economic theory to psychology.

So, the development of the present article departs from presentation of a concise review of this literature. In particular, it will regard the motivations of volunteering, in order to precise the motivations of those who participate in no profit firms. This article presents a theoretical model that can explain the results of some empirical and experimental studies which give results in contrast with the neoclassical theory. This model can be the base for further research.

In the end, as regards environmental policy it will be analyzed “the Motivational Crowding Theory”, concerning environmental values. They find their inspiration from intrinsic motivations that can be negatively influenced by extrinsic motivations, created as a consequence of traditional intervention of government direct to the environmental protection.

1. No profit firm and touristy activity

Some considerations are useful to introduce a theoretical model that could help to identify the most important variables from which derive the sensibility of individuals about public goods as environmental protection. These variables conduct individuals to act in a way that is different from the traditional neoclassic economic theory, which uses the hypothesis of “homo economicus”. Such considerations are essential to appraise the parallel relationships between volunteering and participation in no profit firms, which I present in my introduction. This relationship springs up observing as some individuals don't want occupation in traditional firms, neither they want to assume the role of entrepreneur that aims to profits. They choose instead no profit firms.

It is known that a lot of literature is interested to no profit firms and study in depth its characteristics and its objectives. But it may be necessary to point out that no profit firms can develop an important role in touristy sector. It is known that touristy activity presents peculiar problems, but they can be faced thanks to no profit firms. The first is the problem of trust. Tourists may be more sure if the firms that offer touristy services are firms that haven't profit objectives. It must put in evidence the necessity of empathy between tourists and those who spend time and ability with them. Empathy burns when there are relational goods which have the capacity to create satisfaction both to those who utilize them and to people who offer them.

In this case no profit firms are important. It is possible to use as example the services offered by touristy guides that regards both physical environment and cultural goods. Speaking about culture inside the touristy sector, it is necessary remember that, in this case, there are relation goods to offer also. In fact, for the purpose to establish a meaningful contact among the different cultures of tourists and local population, it is essential that touristy operators have a great knowledge and a felt adhesion to the cultural values to communicate. They are elements that it is difficult to find in touristy firms aiming to profit.

A particular argument is that concerning the offer of public goods as the environmental protection, for which there are problems as the *free rider* and *cooperation*. The literature has identified a “*free-ride*” effect, in order to explain why people do not participate actively in voluntary organizations. Thus, if an individual perceives that can benefit from any successful outcome of collective action, whether or not they contributed to achieve it, then can decide not to contribute actively at all. According to Lubell et al. (2006, p. 150), when collective action is analyzed, it is necessary “to incorporate the logic of free riding by acknowledging that the contribution of a single individual only raises the probability of successfully providing a public good by small amount. From this perspective, how individuals perceive their own personal influence on collective outcomes is the critical value”. So, the free-rider effect is a significant and additional argument that clarifies why people can fail to participate actively in environmental groups.

These problems are attenuated in the case of no profit firm, because it has distinctive characteristics, in which prevail cooperation, informal relationships and the presence of motivated operators.

2. Role of volunteering and its motivations for environmental protection

Why is it that a growing number of studies are devoted to examining individual environmental preferences, proposing that individuals' environmental morale or attitudes could help to reduce environmental degradation or the problems of free riding associated with public goods? One motivation for such a suggestion is that control and deterrence models predict a far lower level of compliance than that actually observed. In many countries, the level of government control is too low to explain the high degree of environmental compliance.

There are some studies exploring empirically whether such proenvironmental attitudes exert a positive effect on either environmental behaviour or involvement in environmental organizations. The presence of such norms or environmental motivation, influencing the willingness to protect the environment, is especially useful in situations where it is extraordinarily expensive to arrange a regulatory enforcement regime. A desirable and positive side effect of voluntary compliance is that it lowers the cost of government operations aimed at ensuring public good provision. I focus on the individuals' participation in environmental organizations because it is a cooperative behaviour that can improve social capital, especially the network component. Recent studies in the area of ecological economics have shown that social capital indeed influences transaction costs and can also have some bearing on the effectiveness of public environmental policies (see Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007).

These results suggest that “environmental conflicts can be resolved by making collective choices that are implemented by establishing, changing or reaffirming governance institutions” (Paavola and Adger, 2005, p. 364). The adaptive capability of societies is strongly linked to their ability to act collectively (Adger, 2003), thus the existence of social capital is important when dealing with new environmental scenarios, such as the threat of climate change, or for

coping with the impact of environmental disasters, such as droughts or floods. Katz (2000) showed that social capital is related to the ability to address several market failures regarding common property natural resources.

The strength of this paper lies in exploring the impact of environmental motivation on environmental behaviour.

The aforesaid empirical studies have shown the importance of volunteering and the motivations that determine it. Such studies have presented results that contrast with the dominant neoclassical theory. This theory affirms that in consumer's behavior the satisfaction of his interest prevails. Therefore it is necessary to face the problem from theoretical point of view, so that such empirical and experimental results can acquire a general character of validity.

I can pursue this objective using the tools of the neoclassical theory, but with the necessary modifications in the structure of consumer functions. Before introducing the theoretical model it is necessary some general considerations.

3. Theoretical considerations

What is the meaning of pro-environmental behaviour? Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) define it as actions taken by an individual in consciously seeking to minimize the negative impact of human activities on the environment and Jensen (2002) refers to those personal actions that are directly related to environmental improvements. Some daily activities, such as minimizing resource and energy consumption, reducing and recycling waste, or using public transport are private actions which contribute to the preservation of nature.

In the same way, participation in environmental organizations can be seen as a kind of pro-environmental behaviour and is highly relevant in ensuring the efficacy of environmental policies which require behavioural changes. As Handy (2001, p.648) pointed out, "much of the initial ? impetus towards change for protecting environmental quality came from concerned individuals who have often come together and formed voluntary no profit associations to collectively address environmental concerns. Their persistent lobbying and advocating for environmental protection have changed public sentiment, thereby convincing government and businesses to pay attention to their demands. Nevertheless, many environmental no profit organisations continue to play an important role in advocating a better environmental quality".

Civil engagement in voluntary organizations is gaining increased attention from researchers; nonetheless the causes of environmental participation are still relatively unknown. The benefit of participation in voluntary activities is the creation of social output that would per se require paid resources (Freeman, 1997). Pretty and Ward (2001) showed that the creation of active pro-environmental groups was significant for solving certain local environmental problems.

The advantage of focusing on direct participation in environmental organizations is that individuals' behaviour can be measured. Moreover, it builds a bridge between the social capital literature that focuses on volunteering and the environmental literature on pro-environmental preferences.

The previous literature has shown how values and attitudes can affect individual behaviour in more general sense (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Lewis, 1982). Thus, it is useful to explore whether the decision to participate in environmental organizations is driven by a set of attitudes and norms. My theoretical model is strongly influenced by previous studies on altruism (Andreoni, 1990) and moral motivation to offer a public good as it is the environmental protection (Brekke et al. 2003).

When considered from an economic perspective, environmental participation "exemplifies an individual's voluntary effort to provide an environmental public good" (Clark et al. 2003, p. 238). An economic analysis also prompts the question: why do people take actions (incurring private costs) that result in collective benefits? While the traditional theoretical models predict a free-rider effect in the private provision of public goods, in practice we find clear evidence to the contrary (Andreoni, 1988; Piliavin and Charng, 1990). Andreoni (1990, p. 465) developed an important model of impure altruism as a means of understanding donations to public goods. He assumes an economy with only one private good and one public good. The individual' utility donation function depends from the consumption of a private good (x_i), the total amount of a public good (G), and the individual's gift to the public good (g_i). Thus, $U_i = U(x_i, G, g_i)$. This allows the author to differentiate two cases, namely a purely altruistic situation $U(x_i, G_i)$ when the individual cares nothing for the private gift, and $U(x_i, g_i)$ when the individual is motivated to give only by a "warm-glow" outcome (purely egoistic). The cases in between are defined as an impurely altruistic behaviour. However, he acknowledges that there are important alternative approaches to such an impure altruism model, namely moral or group-interested behaviour. In line with this suggestion, Brekke et al. (2003) implement moral motivation in their model by working with a social welfare function to determine the morally ideal effort, where individuals share a utilitarian moral philosophy. For simplicity, they assume that the labour supply and the income are exogenously fixed. In a next step, individuals maximize their utility in a benefit-cost environment, trading the benefits of maintaining a self-image as socially responsible individuals against the costs.

The desire to improve self-image induces an improved effort towards upholding beliefs that are perceived to be morally right.

4. A model of volunteering for environmental protection

Keeping in mind the theoretical work outlined above, we examine the motivation for environmental participation by developing a model of volunteering. We assume that individual's utility function is given by

$$U_i = U(x_i, l_i, G, \lambda_i) \quad (1)$$

where x_i is individual i 's consumption of private goods, l_i represents leisure, G is the public good of increasing environmental quality, and λ the utility from participating voluntarily in an environmental organization.

Voluntary work is time consuming and subject to opportunity costs. Thus, v_i represents the hours spent for voluntary work in an environmental organization.

Individuals' consumption can therefore be written as an income constraint, defined by the product of the wage rate w and the working hours $T - l_i - v_i \geq 0$ where T is the time constraint (available time);

$$x_i = w_i(T - l_i - v_i) \quad (2)$$

The total amount of public good (environmental quality) depends on the public provision G_p and private provision $\sum_i g_i$; assuming identical individuals N :

$$G = G_p + \sum_i g_i \quad (3)$$

where

$$g_i = \alpha v_i \quad (4)$$

is individual's production function that depends on the level of voluntary participation v_i in one environmental organization and an efficiency parameter α . Since we have identical individuals $\sum_i g_i$ is equal to $N g_i$. Therefore, we can write:

$$G = G_p + N \alpha v_i \quad (5)$$

The utility from participating in a voluntary environmental organization (λ_i) has the following form:

$$\lambda_i = m_i v_i - (m_i - v_i)^2 \quad (6)$$

where m_i is a factor that measures the individual's motivation to contribute to the quality of environment ($m_i \geq 0$). It measures what the individual believes to be the morally ideal environmental involvement. Thus, participating in voluntary organizations is correlated with individuals' motivation towards contribution and this enhances the individual's utility function (see first term). On the other hand, if the participation in voluntary organizations is lower than the morally ideal environmental involvement ($v_i < m_i$), individuals also experience moral or psychic costs (see second term). This induces a feeling of guilt and shame.

We also assume that the utility function is additively separable in x_i, l_i, G and λ_i . The utility function thus becomes:

$$U_i = x_i + l_i + G + \lambda_i \quad (7)$$

Considering (2) to (6) leads to the following utility function:

$$U_i = w_i(T - l_i - v_i) + l_i + (G_p + N \alpha v_i) + m_i v_i - (m_i - v_i)^2 \quad (8)$$

An individual maximizes utility (8) subject to his voluntary involvement in an environmental organization (v_i). Setting the first order condition $U'_i = \partial U_i / \partial v_i$ equal to 0 leads to the following condition for the optimal effort engagement :

$$U'_i = \partial U_i / \partial v_i = -w_i + N \alpha + m_i + 2m_i - 2v_i = 0$$

$$v_i = \frac{-w_i + N \alpha + 3m_i}{2} \quad (9)$$

Eq. (9) suggests that environmental participation will increase with an increase in individual's motivation to contribute. Thus, it is possible to develop the following main conclusion: a higher level of environmental motivation standards leads to a stronger voluntary involvement in no profit environmental organizations.

Moreover, Eq. (9) also indicates that an increase in the wage rate changes the allocation of time. This increase leads to a decline of voluntary work in environmental organizations.

However, such a negative effect is reduced with a higher level of efficiency in the contribution of the private provision of the public good, α , multiplied by the number of individuals in the society.

It is possible also to maximize consumer's utility (8) subject to m_i . The first order condition $U'_i = \partial U_i / \partial m_i$ equal to 0 leads to the following condition for the optimal level of motivations (m_i^*).

$$U'_i = \partial U_i / \partial m_i = 3v_i - 2m_i = 0$$

$$m_i = 3/2 v_i \quad (10)$$

There is a direct relation between motivation and participation. Higher is the participation, stronger is motivation. As the participation to no profit firms and generally to voluntary organizations can be measured, it is possible to obtain the intensity of environmental motivation.

It should be noted that I have implemented a consumer model. One may argue that individuals are also volunteering to accumulate human capital with the intention of increasing future income through the acquisition of certain types of skills and through creating and developing networks that enhance their human capital (Hackl et al., 2007).

This would require the use of an investment model with a dynamic structure. However, the consumer model presented here is useful and appropriate for exploring moral values influencing environmental motivations.

5. "Motivational Crowding Theory" and the Interaction between Environmental Policy and Environmental Moral Values

In the paragraph 4, the model of volunteering for environmental protection point out the importance of environmental moral values as regards participation in no profit firms and generally in voluntary organizations. These moral values can be considered as a conglomerate of intrinsic motivations.

It is not given but depends on a great many factors. A crucial question is how intrinsic motivation is influenced by extrinsic motivation. This is particularly important for environmental policy with its interventions from outside in the form of commands and controls (as in the traditional policy) or in the form of induced price changes (as in the market based economic approach).

These issues have been analyzed in "Motivational Crowding Theory" which stems from social psychology and has been integrated into economics (Frey 1992, 1997, Le Grand 2003, Bénabou and Tirole 2003).

Social psychologists have analyzed and empirically measured the "hidden cost of reward" (see Deci and Ryan 1985, Pittman and Heller 1987) suggesting that an external intervention in the form of a reward may reduce individuals' intrinsic incentives to act. This *crowding-out* effect can be attributed to two major psychological processes.

(1) *Self-determination is reduced*. When people perceive external interventions as a restriction to act autonomously, intrinsic motivation is substituted by these external interventions. The locus of control shifts from inside to outside the person (Rotter 1966). The person in question no longer feels responsible but makes the outside intervention responsible instead. However, this shift in the locus of control only takes place when the intervention is considered to be controlling. In contrast, when the intervention is perceived to be supportive, in the sense that it acknowledges one's competence, internal control is strengthened. Intrinsic or extrinsic motivation is raised depending on which aspect is more prominent.

(2) *Reciprocity is violated*. The implicit contract based on mutual acknowledgment of one's engagement is violated when a task undertaken by intrinsic motivation is rewarded extrinsically (Gouldner 1960). Conversely, maintaining norms of reciprocity causes a higher willingness to contribute to a public good or prevent over-exploitation of a common pool resource.

The "hidden costs of reward" have been generalized in economics in three dimensions:

- All outside interventions can affect intrinsic motivation: in addition to *rewards* the same effect can come about by external *regulations* (commands and controls).
- External interventions *crowd-out* intrinsic motivation if they are perceived to be *controlling* and they *crowd-in* intrinsic motivation if they are perceived to be *supporting*.

Intrinsic motivation is bolstered by the following factors leading to the *crowding-in* effect:

- Personal relationships foster intrinsic motivation*. Mutual acknowledgment of one's obligations and responsibilities is appreciated among friends, colleagues and family members. Thus, team-based or community-based structures provide motivational benefits (Grant 1996, p. 118).

(ii) *Principals and agents communicate with each other.*

Communication is a precondition for reciprocity via learning about, and acknowledging the duties and responsibilities of other people. Experiments show that communication systematically raises the intrinsic motivation to cooperate (Dawes, Van de Kragt and Orbell 1988, Frey and Bohnet 1995).

(iii) *Citizens participate in decision making.* The greater the possibility to codetermine, the more the citizens would adopt decisions as their own. Participation thus raises self-determination and is a precondition for reciprocity.

c) Motivational crowding effects must be considered simultaneously with the relative price effect (Psychologists considered the first effect in isolation, while economists were aware of only the second effect).

Conclusion

This article has permitted to deepen the thesis regarding moral values that push individuals towards the participation in no profit firms (especially those concerning touristy activity and the offer of public goods as it is environmental protection) are like moral values of volunteering in other no profit organizations.

The literature about volunteering has been of great help; it recently has been increased thanks to important contributes coming from various disciplines as economics and psychology. I presented them in a concise way with more attention to no profit firms in touristy sector to give relevance to some of its characteristics tanks to them they can furnish more qualified services respectful of environment quality, which is an important public good.

Considering that numerous empirical and experimental studies have shown that the prescriptions of neoclassical theory are not realistic, in this article a theoretical model has been introduced. In it the individual's function of utility is integrated with total amount of the production of public goods and the individual participation in the production of such goods. This function is identified as a function of utility based on an "impurely altruism".

The use of this model permits to individualize the optimal level of voluntary participation in a no profit firm or generally in others no profit organizations, which maximize the utility of consumer.

Beside it has allowed also the measurement of motivational factor after the individuations of its optimal level which permits to maximize the individual's utility function. This result is possible because individual participations in volunteering no profit organizations so as in no profit firms is a variable that we can verify.

In this article I have obtained another result, explaining the "Motivation Crowding Theory", built by psychologist and integrated within the economic theory. This theory considers the influence on individual motivations, identified as intrinsic motivations, caused by extrinsic motivations. It sustains that the intervention of the State foreseen by economic theory can determine negative effects on the intrinsic individual motivations, reducing the personal contribution to the offer of a public good, especially if it regards the problems of environmental policy.

What I have said concern environmental policy, as regards how the State could intervene for environmental protection, stimulating instead to refrain the spontaneous contribution that individuals give thanks to their environmental morale values.

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